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time stamps of the trafﬁc ﬂows. This provides us the means
to visualize the behaviors of the network trafﬁc both in spatial
and temporal presentations. It is worth to note that the attack
trafﬁc ﬂows and the normal trafﬁc ﬂows are fed into the
system separately. This ensures that the attack trafﬁc ﬂows and
normal trafﬁc ﬂows can generate their own maps, rules, and
trajectories speciﬁcally and separately, creating ‘ﬁngerprints’
for the visualized behaviour. This is similar to the ‘ﬁngerprints’
owned by individuals. Different attacks’ behaviors can be
recognized and visualized by the means of the ‘ﬁngerprints’.
In this research, as a case study, we speciﬁcally analyze the
SSH brute force attacks behaviors and normal SSH trafﬁc
behaviors by using the proposed system. In other words, we
generated ‘ﬁngerprints’ for each one of these behaviour by
using our proposed system. The SSH Brute force attack is
one of the most prevalent attacks in computer networks. The
attacker’s objective is to gain SSH access to target machine
by trying many passwords or passphrases. Based on the
experimental results, the proposed system could model the
differences between the attack and normal behaviors of the
same application, namely SSH. One valuable ﬁnding is that
the patterns (ﬁngerprints) generated from the normal trafﬁc are
totally different from the patterns (ﬁngerprints) generated by
the SSH brute force attacks trafﬁc. The contributions of this
work include: a data analytics based system to provide easily
interpretable insight into the trafﬁc ﬂows, and a mechanism
of generating ‘ﬁngerprints’ for different behaviors in order to
support further analysis for malicious behavior detection.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The related
work in the literature is summarized in Section II. The
methodologies of the proposed system are detailed in Section
III. Section IV presents the experiments and results. Finally,
conclusions are drawn and the future work is discussed in
Section V.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Flow based or packet based data analytics algorithms such
as unsupervised and supervised learning algorithms have been
investigated for intrusion detection system (IDS) and anomaly
Abstract—In this research, we explore a data analytics based 
approach for modeling and visualizing attack behaviors. To 
this end, we employ Self-Organizing Map and Association Rule 
Mining algorithms to analyze and interpret the behaviors of SSH 
brute force attacks and SSH normal trafﬁc as a case study. 
The experimental results based on four different data sets show 
that the patterns extracted and interpreted from the SSH brute 
force attack data sets are similar to each other but signiﬁcantly 
different from those extracted from the SSH normal trafﬁc data 
sets. The analysis of the attack trafﬁc provides insight into 
behavior modeling for brute force SSH attacks. Furthermore, 
this sheds light into how data analytics could help in modeling 
and visualizing attack behaviors in general in terms of data 
acquisition and feature extraction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, network trafﬁc analysis is performed for the 
purpose of performance, security, or general network oper-
ations and management. For the purpose of security, intru-
sion/malware detection and prevention is one of its application 
domains. In general, these security systems can be classiﬁed 
into two classes: signature based detection and anomaly based 
detection. Machine learning algorithms have been investigated 
for both signature and anomaly based detection. However, 
Sommer et al. [1] suggested to strengthen future research 
on anomaly detection is to provide insight into the decision 
process of the anomaly detection systems [1]. In this paper, our 
objective is to use data analytics, speciﬁcally machine learning 
algorithms to provide insight into analyzing and modeling 
attack behaviors. In doing so, our aim is to develop support 
systems for human experts of the network operations and 
management teams to visualize, analyze and model new threats 
and attacks to come.
There are two major components of the proposed system. 
First, we employ Self-Organizing Map (SOM) which is an 
unsupervised learning algorithm to investigate the distributions 
of the trafﬁc ﬂows on a topographical two-dimensional map. 
Then, Association Rule Mining (ARM) is employed to provide 
insight into the clusters on the SOM by generating association 
rules between the features of the trafﬁc ﬂows. Finally, we 
present trajectories on top of the SOM clusters based on the
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detection systems (ADS) for years. Usually the performance
of the designed algorithms are evaluated using detection rate
and false alarm (positive/negative) rate. Many researches [2]
[3] [4] [5] [6] proposed and explored different mechanisms
to improve the detection rate and meanwhile reduce the false
positive rate on detecting different types of attack behaviors.
However, detection and false positive rates do not provide
security analysts any insight to understand the behaviors of
the attacks or to support decision making in real time. We
believe that tools and techniques that will assist to visualize,
model and understand different attack behaviors are necessary
to support security analysts. To this end, some researchers have
employed machine learning and visualization algorithms to
model and understand different aspects of attack behaviors.
Atkison et al [7] used information retrieval techniques to
ﬁrst organize the Telnet trafﬁc by packets and sessions, then
the sessions with different attack or normal labels were loaded
into a database. Given an attack session, the similarity scores
between the given attack and the known attacks within the
database were then calculated. To visualize and understand
behavior similarity between the given attack and the known
attacks, the similarity score lists were loaded into a visualiza-
tion system. This approach was demonstrated on three types
of attacks and on a small corpora constructed by the authors.
In [8], Intarasothonchun and Srimuang used the best-ﬁrst
selection and the greedy stepwise algorithms to ﬁnd the
relevant features to present different attack behaviors based on
the KDD’99 data set. Then, different classiﬁcation algorithms,
namely Weighted extreme learning model and Support Vector
Machine (SVM) + Genetic Algorithms (GA) were employed.
Even though their results were promising, the behavioral
patterns of attacks in terms of the spatial and temporal aspects
were not modeled or presented.
Jyothi et. al [9] proposed a system that combined hardware
statistics, network statistics and application statistics to present
the behaviors of the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks and then applied different learning algorithms such
as K-means and SVM to detect the DDoS. Similar to the
other works, the behavior patterns and the rationale behind
the patterns were not explored using the learning algorithms.
In summary, to the best of our knowledge, previous research
employed machine learning and visualization techniques to
analyze attacks and anomalies. However, in this research, our
objective is to combine machine learning and visualization to
model attack patterns and trajectories by generating ﬁnger-
prints of different normal and attack behaviours. In doing so,
we aim to support security analysts in their decision making
process.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this work, we employ two unsupervised learning algo-
rithms - Self-Organizing Map (SOM) and Association Rule
Mining (ARM) to model and visualize the network ﬂow
behaviors of a host. The reason we employ unsupervised
learning is that ﬁnding labeled trafﬁc to train supervised
learning algorithms is very costly in practice. Such an activity
implies that somehow a human expert analyzes interesting
trafﬁc and labels it as “attack” or something else. This can
become a very challenging activity and can only scale to small
data sets. However, as the data ﬂow on the Internet grows, it
seems more practical to use unsupervised learning which does
not require labels during the training phase.
A. Overview of the Proposed System
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Fig. 1. Overview of the proposed system
Figure 1 shows the overview of the system. The proposed
system is designed to work with network trafﬁc ﬂows. In
this research, we used publicly available trafﬁc and SSH
Brute force attack trafﬁc generated by Ncrack [10]. Tranalyzer
[11] [12] is employed to export (generate) ﬂows from the
trafﬁc based on the captured network packets. Some pre-
processing steps that include feature reconstruction and data
normalization are employed before the network ﬂows are used
to train the SOM. The pre-processing steps include:
• Feature reconstruction: Tranalyzer constructs 93 features
per ﬂow [12]. The speciﬁc features that were used in this
proposed system are detailed in the section 4.
• Data normalization: All the features are normalized into
the range of 0 to 1 to avoid learning biases on any of
the features. The normalization function we used in this
research is linear normalization.
After pre-processing, all network ﬂows are used to train
the SOM to identify patterns in the trafﬁc. On top of the
trained SOM map, we employ three methods to visualize and
understand the network ﬂow behaviors.
• Visualization of the distribution of the network ﬂow
clusters based on the techniques provided by the SOM:
To this end, SOM U-Matrixes are used as the two
dimensional topographic graphs.
• Visualization of regularities between ﬂow features and
clusters by using ARM: The ARM algorithm is not
feasible if a feature value is not discrete. To transfer the
continuous values to discrete values, we generate a set of
ranges based on the distribution of the values. A value in
a range is represented by the assigned label or index to the
range. A port number could be any value from 0 to 65536.
So, based on the distribution of source port numbers in
the input network ﬂow data set, a set of ranges: 0 - 500,
500 - 2000, 2000 - 5000, 5000 - 65536 are generated. For
example, if the source port number is 22, it is assigned
to range 1.
• Visualization of the temporal behaviors of the network
trafﬁc using ﬂow trajectories on the trained SOM: Net-
work ﬂows are a set of sequential packets between two
hosts and their speciﬁc ports over a speciﬁc period of
time. Thus, it is more likely that a combination of network
ﬂows may reﬂect a pattern for a certain attack activity. In
order to visualize such network behaviors within a time
period, hit trajectories on the trained SOM is proposed
here. This could assist the security analysts to visualize
the sequential ﬂows, so that the patterns of network
behaviors can be further analyzed.
The details of the SOM and ARM learning algorithms are
provided in the following subsections.
B. Self-Organizing Map and Data Visualization
A basic SOM consists of M neurons located on a low
dimensional grid (usually 1 or 2 dimensional) [13]. The algo-
rithm responsible for the formation of the SOM involves three
basic steps after initialization: sampling, similarity matching,
and updating. These three steps are repeated until the forma-
tion of the feature map has completed. Each neuron i has a d-
dimensional prototype weight vector Wi = Wi1,Wi1, ...,Wid.
Given X is a d-dimensional sample data(input vector), the
algorithm is summarized as follows:
• Initialization:
Choose random values to initialize all the neuron weight
vectors Wi(0), i = 1, 2, ...,M, where M is the total
number of neurons in the map.
• Sampling:
Draw a sample data X from the input space with a
uniform probability.
• Similarity Matching:
Find the best matching unit (BMU) or winner neuron
of X , denoted here by b which is the closest neuron
(map unit) to X in the criterion of minimum Euclidean
distance, at time step n (nth training iteration).
b = argmin
i
||X −Wi(n)||, i = 1, 2, ...,M (1)
• Updating:
Adjust the weight vectors of all neurons by using a update
formula, so that the best matching unit (BMU) and its
topological neighbors are moved closer to the input vector
X in the input space.
• Continuation:
Continue with sampling until no noticeable changes in
the feature map are observed or the pre-deﬁned maximum
number of iterations is reached.
The most commonly used visualization techniques of SOM
are the U-Matrix and Hit histogram. The U-matrix [13] holds
all distances between neurons and their immediate neighbor
neurons. It gives a direct visualization of the number of
clusters and their distribution on a two dimensional space. The
hit histogram of the input data set on the trained map provides
a visualization that details the distribution of input data across
the clusters. Each input data instance in the data set can be
projected (hit) to the closest neuron on a trained SOM map.
The hit histogram is constructed by counting the number of
hits each neuron receives from the input data set. On the hit
histogram, the larger the shaded area is on the neuron, the
more hits the neuron receives.
C. Association Rule Mining and Identifying Rules Automati-
cally
Traditionally, ARM is used to ﬁnd items that occur si-
multaneously and often in database transactions [14]. Given
a set of items I = I1, I2, ..., Im and a set of database
transactions T = t1, t2, ..., tn where ti = Ii1, Ii2, ..., Iim and
Iij ∈ I(i = 1, ..., n, j = 1, ...,m) The standard deﬁnition of
ARM is to ﬁnd a set of rules expressed in the form of 2:
X → Y (2)
where X,Y ⊆ I are sets of items called itemsets, and X ∩
Y = ∅.
The signiﬁcance of the rules that are identiﬁed through the
learning algorithm are measured in terms of their support rates
(S) and conﬁdence rates (C), as shown in equations 3 and 4.
S(X → Y ) = |X ∪ Y ||T | (3)
C(X → Y ) = |X ∪ Y ||X| (4)
where | · | denotes number of items in a itemset.
Support rate implies how often the rule is applicable to a
given transaction set. Support rate measures the popularity
of the rule. Conﬁdence rate implies how frequently items
in Y appear in transactions that contain X . Conﬁdence rate
measures the reliability of the inference made by a rule. In
the data mining ﬁeld, thresholds are set for support rate and
conﬁdence rate to ﬁnd the set of rules are are most popular
and reliable.
In this work, we use ARM to identify rules automatically in
order to facilitate the understanding of network behaviors and
features that are hit to one or more neurons on the SOM map.
The most frequent and reliable rules are identiﬁed by using
high thresholds of the support rate and the conﬁdence rate.
IV. EVALUATIONS AND RESULTS
In order to evaluate the proposed system, two different SSH
brute force attack trafﬁc data sets and two normal trafﬁc data
sets are used. One of the SSH brute force attack data sets is
generated by Ncrack [10]. The other SSH bruce force attack
data set is extracted from the public benchmarking data set:
ISCX [15]. The ISCX data set contains trafﬁc that are labelled
as either attack or normal. The two normal network trafﬁc data
sets are extracted from: ISCX and DARPA (week-1 and week-
3), which are all labelled as normal [16]. These data sets are
summarized in Table I.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF DATA SETS
Data Set Type Data Set Name # of Flows
Attack Ncrack SSH Brute Force 57992ISCX SSH Brute Force 10154
Normal ISCX SSH Normal 4265DARPA SSH Normal 1384
A. Ncrack
Ncrack is a network cracking tool that is designed to be
a fast and ﬂexible network authentication cracker and can
perform brute force attacks across the network [10].
In this research, we used Ncrack to generate all the brute
force attack trafﬁc on our network testbed. Speciﬁcally, two
linux machines were set up on the network. One is the attacker
machine, the other is the targeted victim. A password list
that contains 110,000 passwords was used to perform a SSH
brute force password cracking attack to the victim machine.
Wireshark [17] was employed to capture the network packets
on the victim machine. Tranalyzer2 [11] was employed to
export the ﬂows from the captured trafﬁc. The ﬂow features
that are extracted from the Tranalyzer2 are shown in Table II.
After going through the pre-processing steps detailed in
section III-A, all the network ﬂows were fed into the SOM
to train the map. The training parameters of the SOM are
presented in Table III. The U-Matrix and hit histogram of
Figure 2 show the clusters - modeling the captured data -
on the trained SOM. Four clusters that are manually circled in
green lines can be clearly visualized based on the combination
of U-Matrix and hit histogram. They are summarized as four
different clusters in table IV: top left (TL), top right (TR),
bottom right (BR) and bottom left (BL) based on the location
TABLE II
FEATURES OF THE NETWORK FLOW
Feature Name Tranalyzer2 Feature Name
Duration Duration
TCP Flags tcpAggrFlags
Source Port SrcPort
Destination Port DstPort
Packets numPktsSnt
Octets numBytesSnt
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Fig. 2. U-matrix, Hit histogram of SOM - Ncrack SSH Brute Force
of the clusters on the map. These incoming and outgoing trafﬁc
generated by Ncrack are clearly separated on the trained SOM
map. It indicates that different behaviors can be identiﬁed on
the learned model given by the SOM.
TABLE III
SOM TRAINING PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Map Size 5 X 5
Initial neighborhood size 3
Layer topology function Hexagon
Neuron distance kernel function Link distance
Training Epochs 500,000
In order to to automate the process of ﬁnding rules to
identify the trafﬁc patterns of each cluster, association rule
mining (ARM) is used on the four clusters. Since the values
of all features summarized in Table II are not discrete, ranges
are generated to transfer a continuous value into a discrete
value. By applying support rate threshold 0.1 and conﬁdence
rate threshold 1, we identiﬁed a set of highly reliable rules
for each cluster, Table V. Based on these rules, we identiﬁed
that ﬂows with larger number of packets and longer duration
are within the two bottom clusters (BR and BL). While, ﬂows
with smaller number of packets and shorter duration are within
the top two clusters (TL and TR).
TABLE IV
OVERVIEW OF CLUSTERS - NCRACK SSH BRUTE FORCE
Cluster Neuron Indexes Direction
TL 17, 21, 22 Incoming
TR 19, 20, 24, 25 Outgoing
BR 04, 05, 09, 10 Outgoing
BL 01, 02, 06, 11, 12, 13, 16 Incoming
TABLE V
ASSOCIATION RULE MINING RESULTS - NCRACK SSH BRUTE FORCE
Cluster Sample Rules
TL Octets = 0, Packets = (2-4), TCPﬂags = (15-20),DstPort = (0-500), Duration = (0-2) → TL (S:0.162, C:1.0)
TR Octets = 0, Packets = (2-4), TCPﬂags = (15-20),SrcPort = (0-500), Duration = (0-2) → TR (S:0.162, C:1.0)
BL
Packets = (14-16), TCPﬂags = (25-30),
DstPort = (0-500) → BL (S:0.210, C:1.0)
Octets = 0, Packets = (12-14), TCPﬂags = (15-20),
DstPort = (0-500), Duration = (0-2) → BL (S:0.337, C:1.0)
DstPort = (0-500), Duration = (12-14) → BL (S:0.194, C:1.0)
BR
Octets = (2500-3000), Packets = (20+), TCPﬂags = (25-30),
SrcPort = (0-500) → BR (S:0.337, C:1.0)
Octets = (2500-3000), Packets = (20+), TCPﬂags = (25-30),
SrcPort = (0-500), Duration = (12-14) → BR (S:0.194, C:1.0)
Packets = (20+), TCPﬂags = (25-30),
Duration = (10-12) → BR (S:0.133, C:1.0)
One network ﬂow is not enough to reﬂect the attacker’s
behaviors over time. Temporal visualization of network ﬂows
changing along with the time could also provide a valuable in-
sight to the attacker’s behaviors. Figure 3 shows the incoming
and outgoing network trafﬁc by using the time stamps.
Fig. 3. Flow trajectory on SOM - Ncrack SSH Brute Force
If the trajectory is presented by using a sequence of clusters,
it will be as BL → BR → BL → BR → TL → BR →
TR → BL → BR → BL → TL → BL → BR → TR →
BR→ BL→ . . . . This shows that most of the time, the trafﬁc
ﬂows are back and forth between the incoming and outgoing
clusters on the map. However, sometimes one incoming trafﬁc
could be followed by another incoming trafﬁc. This seems
to be because of the way Ncrack runs the SSH brute force
attack using multi-threads. Two or more attack actions can be
initiated from different source ports subsequently, and some
attack actions might consist of a higher number of packets,
while some might consist of a smaller number of packets.
B. ISCX SSH Brute Force
ISCX data set simulates user behaviors which were ab-
stracted into proﬁles [15]. The attack scenarios were designed
to show the real-world cases of malicious behaviors. This data
set consists of the seven days of network activity. Three days
contain only normal trafﬁc. The other four days contain four
different attacks and normal activity. In this work, the SSH
brute force attacks are extracted from this data set to use in
our evaluations. We used the same features, pre-processing,
normalization and training parameters as before to represent
these trafﬁc ﬂows to the SOM.
TABLE VI
OVERVIEW OF CLUSTERS - ISCX SSH BRUTE FORCE
Cluster Neuron Indexes Direction
BL 01 Outgoing
TL 07, 13, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23 Outgoing
R 05, 09, 10, 15, 20, Incoming
The U-Matrix and hit histogram in Figure 4 show the
clusters modeling the data on the trained SOM. In this case,
there are three clusters: bottom left (BL), top left (TL) and
right (R). Based on the U-Matrix and hit histogram, the cluster
distribution and the reason behind the distribution are the same
as Ncrack - the incoming and outgoing trafﬁc ﬂows are clearly
separated on the trained SOM map. Table VI summarizes the
neurons of each cluster. Further investigation shows that there
are two clusters for incoming ﬂows and one for outgoing
ﬂows. After applying ARM algorithm to the trafﬁc ﬂows for
each cluster, it is identiﬁed that the BL cluster contains all
the incoming trafﬁc that has a short duration, extremely small
number of packets, and TCP ﬂag values that are in the range
(20,25). This is very different from the rest of the network
trafﬁc. The outgoing ﬂows are all in the R cluster that has
similar number of packets and the same range of TCP ﬂag
values. Table VII shows the rules with conﬁdence rate of 1.
TABLE VII
ASSOCIATION RULE MINING RESULTS - ISCX SSH BRUTE FORCE
Cluster Sample Rules
BL Octets = (0-500), TCPﬂags = (20-25)SrcPort = (0-500) → BL (S:0.120, C:0.9)
TL
TCPﬂags = (25-30), SrcPort = (0-500) → TL (S:0.262, C:1.0)
Octets = (2000-2500), SrcPort = (0-500) → TL (S:0.262, C:1.0)
Octets = (2000-2500), TCPﬂags = (25-30),
Duration = (2-4) → TL (S:0.262, C:1.0)
R
Octets = (1000-1500), DstPort = (0-500) → R (S:0.352, C:1.0)
TCPﬂags = (25-30), DstPort = (0-500) → R (S:0.450, C:1.0)
DstPort = (0-500) → R (S:1.0, C:1.0)
Figure 5 shows the incoming and outgoing network trafﬁc
over a period of time. The detailed sequence is as R →
BL → R → TL → R → . . . . It should be noted here
that the trajectories of the trafﬁc ﬂows are switching between
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Fig. 4. U-matrix, Hit histogram of SOM - ISCX SSH Brute Force
the incoming and outgoing clusters. The incoming ﬂows that
represent the attack trafﬁc are sometimes extremely short
duration ﬂows followed by a regular duration ﬂow.
Fig. 5. Flow trajectory on SOM - ISCX SSH Brute Force
C. ISCX SSH Normal
In the ISCX data set, there are three days of trafﬁc including
only normal network activities and another four days of trafﬁc
of both attack and normal network activities. For comparison
purposes, we extract all the SSH normal network ﬂows from
the seven days of normal activities.
Then, the data are pre-processed and normalized before
training the SOM. Figure 6 shows the U-Matrix and hit
histogram of the trained SOM. This is very different from
the cluster distributions shown with four SSH brute force data
sets. There is no obvious big clusters on the trained map. The
incoming and outgoing trafﬁc ﬂows are not clearly separated
into clusters. Although there are four neurons that receive more
hits from the trafﬁc ﬂows than the other neurons, overall, they
do not seem to form coherent clusters.

	


	


	


	

Fig. 6. U-matrix, Hit histogram of SOM - ISCX SSH Normal
TABLE VIII
OVERVIEW OF FOUR POPULAR NEURONS - ISCX SSH NORMAL
Neuron Index Direction
01, 22 Outgoing
05, 18 Incoming
TABLE IX
ASSOCIATION RULE MINING RESULTS - ISCX SSH NORMAL
Cluster Sample Rules
01
Octets = (0-500), TCPﬂags = (15-20) → 01 (S:0.1, C:1.0)
Octets = (0-500), Packets = (4-6)
Duration = (30+) → 01 (S:0.1, C:1.0)
TCPﬂags = (15-20), Duration = (30+) → 01 (S:0.1, C:1.0)
05
Packets = (0-2), DstPort = (0-500) → 05 (S:0.1, C:1.0)
Packets = (0-2), Duration = (30+) → 05 (S:0.1, C:1.0)
Octets = (0-500), Packets = (0-2), TCPﬂags = (0-5),
Duration = (30+) → 05 (S:0.1, C:1.0)
18
TCPﬂags = (25-30), DstPort = (0-500) → 18 (S:0.2, C:1.0)
Duration = (4-6), DstPort = (0-500) → 18 (S:0.169, C:1.0)
TCPﬂags = (25-30), DstPort = (0-500),
Duration = (4-6) → 18 (S:0.166, C:1.0)
22
SrcPort = (0-500), TCPﬂags = (25-30) → 22 (S:0.19, C:1.0)
Packets = (20+), TCPﬂags = (25-30),
SrcPort = (0-500) → 22 (S:0.187, C:1.0)
Octets = (5000+), SrcPort = (0-500) → 22 (S:0.165, C:1.0)
Given that, understanding and visualizing the network be-
havior is the objective of this work, we investigated four
neurons that received the most hits on the trained SOM to
understand this behavior better. We identiﬁed that among these
four neurons, two are hit by incoming ﬂows, and the other two
are hit by outgoing ﬂows. Table VIII presents the neurons and
trafﬁc directions on the SOM.
Again, ARM is used to automatically ﬁnd the rules to
identify the differences between the neurons. We found that
some of the ﬂows hit to one of the neurons (neuron 05) have
really long duration (30+ secs), but small number of packets
(0-2 packets). However, some of the ﬂows hit to another
neuron (neuron 22) have short duration (2-4 secs) but larger
number of packets (20+ packets). This kind of behavior was
not available on any of the SSH brute force data sets. Some
of the rules for the four neurons are given in Table IX with
support rates and conﬁdence rates.
Fig. 7. Flow trajectory on SOM - ISCX SSH Normal
The further analysis of the ﬂow trajectories generated by
the incoming and outgoing normal trafﬁc ﬂows are shown in
Figure 7. We think that these normal SSH trafﬁc ﬂows are
generated by a mixed number of normal users using the SSH
services with different objectives. The behavior patterns of
these normal users are different from those of the attackers.
There is no clusters of incoming and outgoing trafﬁcs that
can be identiﬁed by SOM, and the trajectories of the trafﬁc
ﬂows are not switching between the incoming and outgoing
clusters. Thus, what we observe on the SOM maps of the
attack behaviors are totally different than the SOM maps of
the normal trafﬁc behaviors. In short, our proposed approach
with trajectories is able to create ‘ﬁngerprints’ and a good
separation of these different behaviors.
D. DARPA SSH Normal
The other normal SSH trafﬁc data set that is used in this
research is from the DARPA data set [16]. There are three
weeks of network trafﬁc data, and two of them do not contain
any attacks. In this study, normal SSH network trafﬁc ﬂows
which are using port number 22 are extracted from these
normal only weeks. The original DARPA data set is not ﬂow
based, so Tranalyer2 [11] was used to export the ﬂows based
on the packets and the same steps as before are employed to
train the SOM.
Figure 8 shows the U-Matrix and the hit histogram of this
trained SOM. In this case, there are two clusters that are at
the top right (TR) and middle left (ML) of the map. However,
these two clusters do not contain most of the trafﬁc ﬂows
within the data set. A big number of the ﬂows actually hit
the bottom part of the map. Again, this is different from the
cluster distribution of the SSH brute force attack data sets.
Table X summarizes the neurons within the two clusters that
can be visualized on the U-Matrix and the hit histogram.
TABLE X
OVERVIEW OF TWO CLUSTERS - DARPA SSH NORMAL
Cluster Neuron Indexes Direction
TR 20, 24, 25 Incoming
ML 16, 17, 18 Outgoing
TABLE XI
ASSOCIATION RULE MINING RESULTS - DARPA SSH NORMAL
Cluster Sample Rules
ML
Octets = (0), Packets = (0-2),
SrcPort = (0-500) → ML (S:0.261, C:1.0)
Octets = (0), SrcPort = (0-500)
Duration = (0-2) → ML (S:0.261, C:1.0)
Octets = (0), Packets = (0-2), TCPﬂags = (15-20)
SrcPort = (0-500), Duration = (0-2) → ML (S:0.261, C:1.0)
TR
Octets = (0), Packets = (0-2),
DstPort = (0-500) → TR (S:0.266, C:1.0)
Octets = (0), DstPort = (0-500)
Duration = (0-2) → TR (S:0.266, C:1.0)
Octets = (0), Packets = (0-2), TCPﬂags = (15-20)
DstPort = (0-500), Duration = (0-2) → TR (S:0.266, C:1.0)
ARM algorithm is then applied to the two clusters to
automatically create the rules for the trafﬁc ﬂows that hit to
these two clusters. Some of the rules are shown in Table XI.
Both the incoming and outgoing trafﬁc ﬂows in these two
clusters are short duration and small number of packets and
the TCP ﬂag values are within the same range.
Furthermore, the ﬂow trajectory, as shown in Figure 9,
demonstrates that the trafﬁc ﬂows are not switching between
the identiﬁed incoming and outgoing clusters. Instead, they
switch between the neurons around the map. Similar to our
observations with the previous data sets, the trajectories and
association rules learned are quiet different between the normal
and attack behaviors. That means the patterns ﬁngerprinted
in the normal data are signiﬁcantly different from those
ﬁngerprinted from the attack data.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this research, we propose a data analytics based system to
analyze and model the network trafﬁc ﬂows in order to provide
insight to understand the attack behaviors. To this end, instead
of building a system that aims to achieve a high detection rate
and a low false alarm rate, we focus on developing a system
that can analyze the network trafﬁc ﬂows and support decision
making process for the human experts via automatic rule
mining and visualization based on network trafﬁc behaviors.
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Fig. 8. U-matrix, Hit histogram of SOM - DARPA SSH Normal
Fig. 9. Flow trajectory on SOM - Darpa SSH Normal
By making use of the proposed system, a human expert
could beneﬁt from visualizing the behavioral patterns in the
network trafﬁc and understanding the rules behind the patterns.
These patterns can serve as ‘ﬁngerprints’ of speciﬁc attack
trafﬁc, if high similarity between new network trafﬁc and
the ‘ﬁngerprints’ are found, the new network trafﬁc could
potentially be modeled as suspicious (attack) trafﬁc. As a
case study, the proposed system has been analyzed on SSH
network trafﬁc ﬂows by using four different types of SSH
brute force attack data sets and two normal SSH network data
sets. Our evaluations demonstrate that the SSH brute force
attacks have their own behavioral patterns that are different
from the behavioral patterns of the normal SSH network
trafﬁc ﬂows. In the future, we will evaluate the robustness of
the proposed framework based on the frequency of the SSH
attacks. We also plan to expand this system to apply to other
attack behaviours, namely distributed denial of service attacks,
botnets and insider threats. Supervised learning algorithm will
also be investigated to work with the trajectories to automate
the intrusion detection in combining with the visualization.
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